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Has The Right To A Jury Trial As Guaranteed
Under The Seventh Amendment Become Outdated
In Complex Civil Litigation?
Recognizing the continually increasing burden placed on the jury in
complex litigation cases, the author undertakes an extensive study of the
origins of jury trials in the United States and England. Various argu-
ments in favor of eliminating jury trials in complex litigation are dis-
cussed, along with a possible constitutional method of limiting the scope of
the seventh amendment guarantee. The author also studies the case of
Ross v. Bernhardt where the Supreme Court outlined a seldom used three-
pronged test to determine whether or not a jury trial is constitutionally ap-
propriate. The comment concludes that the factors in favor of the jury trial
outweigh any benefit which may be derived from its demise in complex lit-
igation.
The adoption in 1791, of the seventh amendment to the federal
constitution 1 served to preserve the historical English common
law guarantee of a right to jury trial in civil cases.2 The language,
despite an alluring surface simplicity, has proven to be far from
self-explanatory. Rather, the guarantee of a right to jury trial in
civil cases, once regarded as the very basis of free government,
has been a subject of extensive twentieth century interpretation
and attack.3 This article seeks to address one of the newest at-
tacks: whether in protracted and complex civil cases, 4 the sev-
1. For a discussion of the arguments advanced and the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791, see J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 628-48 (1970); 5 Moore's
Federal Practice 38.08[5] (2d ed. 1977).
2. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (action to recover damages for
personal injuries) wherein the Court stated: "In order to ascertain the scope and
meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules
of the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional
provision in 1791." Id. at 476. See also, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,
295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (action to recover for personal injuries).
3. Debate as to whether the seventh amendment requires adherence to a
strict historical test, or serves merely to preserve the substance of the common
law right to trial by jury has been compounded by the effect of the merger of law
and equity courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1938. See
Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1942).
For a general discussion on some of the difficulties in interpreting the seventh
amendment see e.g., James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655
(1963); Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's
Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1281 (1978); Note, Collateral
Estoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEB. L. REV 863 (1978).
4. As used in this article "protracted and complex civil cases" denotes a
enth amendment guarantee should be limited or perhaps
abolished in the interests of fairness and justice.
Although the right to jury trial in all civil cases has often been
said to be such a symbol of democracy that it should be preserved
at all costs, 5 the suggestion that a jury trial in complex cases is no
longer practical, has found some judicial approval. One such
opinion was expressed by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger who
stated concern that complex cases "which are the daily fare of the
courts in the second half of the twentieth century" 6 may tax too
greatly a system contemplated and designed in the late eight-
eenth century.7 Justice John Paul Stevens also expressed con-
cern that scarcity of judicial time may reduce the jury trial in
complex cases to be a "luxury perhaps we can't afford." 8
Whether the right to a jury trial in civil actions is now to be-
come subject to congested court calendars is a question that
lengthy trial focusing usually on business issues, such as those found in ILC Per-
ipherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machine Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
444 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (complex antitrust action involving five month trial, 19 days of
jury deliberation); In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 75 F.R.D.
702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (complex accounting case with trial estimated to last two
years or more); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 62-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (complex antitrust action contesting over 1000 individual contracts); and In
re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (four
to six month estimated trial time and accountings exceeding one billion dollars).
5. In response to the statments of Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Ste-
vens, Philip H. Corboy, Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Liti-
gation stated: "The jury is not a 'luxury' that we can no longer afford. To the
contrary, it is a necessity that we cannot afford to lose." Corboy, Corboy Pleads:
"Halt Erosion of Jury Right", 66 A.B.A. J. 22, 23 (1980). Rather than seeing the jury
as burdensome in trying complex litigation, Mr. Corboy stated: "It is the jury, and
not the judge, which serves as the popular symbol of democracy in the judicial
system .... This is not the first time that the jury has been singled out for its
irrationality or its cost in terms of delay .... " He concluded that we must find
ways of improving the jury system, rather than eliminating it. Corboy, Chairman's
Corner, Litigation News, Jan., 1980 at 5,6.
6. Address by Chief Justice Burger, Conference of State Chief Justices, at
Flagstaff, Arizona (August 1, 1979) (Public Information Office Text).
7. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stated that the following factors should be
taken into consideration with respect to the use of lay jurors in protracted and
complex civil cases: a jury is rarely a true cross-section since those most compe-
tent to understand complex economic or scientific questions rarely survive the
jury selection process; the enormous complexity of the factual issues combined
with the analysis of documents, expert testimony and visual aids create a burden
suitable only for an expert; the instructions as to the law may take days in such
cases; the protracted nature of the trial may exceed the capacity of the jurors to
understand and remember the matters presented throughout; and finally, the im-
pact of thrusting jurors for weeks or months into an alien environment burdened
with the necessity of reaching a decision in areas where they have no experience.
Id. at 3, 4.
8. In addressing the American Bar Association at Dallas, Texas in August of
1979, Mr. Justice John Paul Stevens suggested that the future of the jury trial in
complex civil actions may be uncertain, at best. Lawscope, Juries May Be Luxury
In Future, Says Stevens, 65 A.B.A. J. 1292 (1979).
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strikes directly at the foundation of our judicial system. The an-
swer to such a problem must lie in the nature and scope of our
jurisprudence, and not in the facts of individual cases. Interpreta-
tion of the scope of the seventh amendment guarantees can only
be accomplished through an understanding of the reasons upon
which those guarantees were based and the intentions of the
framers in preserving them for all citizens. Attempts to modify or
limit the right of a jury trial in civil actions were met with jealous
and adamant supporters of that right for over a century. Accusa-
tions of incompetence and inherent fault in jury verdicts must be
examined with an eye to the procedural safeguards and innova-
tions afforded in our courts. Claims that the fifth amendment due
process clause necessitates an erosion of seventh amendment
rights under the principles of fairness, must be scrutinized with
great caution lest in expanding the role of one constitutional pro-
vision, we destroy the purpose of the other.
A determination of the right to jury trial in complex litigation
necessitates an examination of the following factors: first, the na-
ture of the constitutional guarantees in the seventh amendment;
second, the judicial treatment and interpretation of the seventh
amendment since its enactment in 1791; third, the recent inroads
in the constitutional guarantee due to increasingly complex litiga-
tion; fourth, the nature of the jury process, jury composition, com-
prehension, delay, and the manner in which these might impede
complex litigation; fifth, the safeguards against jury incompetence
presently afforded by the legislature and the judiciary; and finally,
the possibility of a constitutional mandate under the fifth amend-
ment due process clause requiring that due process be an excep-
tion to the seventh amendment.
I. SEVENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF A RIGHT To JURY TRIAL
The seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ."9 The scope of the
seventh amendment involved suits at common law where legal
rights were determined, rather than those suits which involved
equitable rights.o In applying the seventh amendment, courts re-
9. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
10. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n., 430 U.S. 442, 449 (1977);
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830). For a list of those actions tradi-
sorted to historical inquiry to determine if the issues involved
should be tried as an action at common law in 1791.11 As Mr. Jus-
tice Story stated in 1812, "[B]eyond all question, the common law
here alluded to is not the common law of any individual state (for
it probably differs in all) but it is the common law of England, the
grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence."12
In determining the right to jury trial in civil actions, recent
courts look to the historical test of the seventh amendment. They
raise the question of whether or not a jury trial might be set
aside, even though it is historically mandated, because the case
involves such complex issues that the jury is unable to compe-
tently decide them.13 In 1970, the Supreme Court suggested in a
footnote 14 that courts might look beyond the historical test to the
practical abilities and limitations of juries15 in deciding whether a
jury trial is required under the seventh amendment. Thus, the in-
itial step in determining the scope of the constitutional right to
jury trial under the seventh amendment is to look to English
Chancery procedure. Inquiry must be made into the use of juries
in common law actions in 1791, and the practical abilities and limi-
tations of jurors in cases of great factual complexity.
A. English Chancery Procedure
The jury trial, the history of which may be traced back thirty
centuries,16 is said to have been brought to England in the l1th
Century.17 While the actual date of the English jury's origin is
unknown in that its "antiquity is beyond the reach of record of
tionally believed to be actions at common law prior to 1791, see 5 MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 38.11 at 118-20 (2d ed. 1977).
11. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). If the action was legal under the
common law of England then the amendment was applicable and a right to jury
trial preserved. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
This was also true of the nearest common law equivalent form of action triable to
a jury in 1791. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
12. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
13. See text Part III infra.
14. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n. 10 (1970).
15. The Ross case involved a shareholder derivative suit, which was tradition-
ally cognizable only in equity. The Court held that, "The Seventh Amendment
question depends upon the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the charac-
ter of the overall action." Id. at 538. The Court elaborated in a footnote that char-
acterization of a legal issue depended upon consideration of three factors: "first,
the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy
sought, and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Id. at 538, n. 10.
16. This theory is set forth by L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLA-
DIUM OF LIBERTY (1973), wherein he states that the first jury trial is duly recorded
in the play Aeschyli Eumenides, written by Aeschylus, who died in 456 B.C., Id. at
1.
17. R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5 (1980).
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history," 18 the sentiment of Englishmen toward jury trial was well
articulated in the writings of Sir William Blackstone.19 His Com-
mentaries on the Law of England, published between 1765 and
1769, provided the fabric for the colonists' legal tradition.2 0 In
writing about jury trials he stated, 'The trial by jury, or the coun-
try, per patriam, is also that trial by the peers of every English-
man, which as the grand bulwark of his liberties, is secured to
him by the greatest charter. ... 21
Another perspective on the importance of jury trials was set
forth by Charles Dickens in his novel, Bleak House.22 In describ-
ing Chancery, where there were no juries, he stated:
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and
meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of
shipping, and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city. Fog on
the Essex marshes, fog on the Kentish heights.
... And hard by the Temple Bar, in Lincoln's Inn Hall, at the very heart
of the fog, sits the Lord High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.
Never can there come fog too thick, never can there come mud and mire
too deep, to assort with the groping and floundering condition which this
High Court of Chancery, most pestilent of hoary sinners, holds this day, in
the sight of heaven and earth.23
The English system of law was divided between a Common
Law Court and the Court of Chancery. The procedures available
in Chancery differed materially from those available at common
law.24 Actions at law were tried before juries and the parties
could not raise equitable claims or defenses. Suits at equity were
18. THE COMPLETE JuRYMAN 3 (anon. 1752) reprinted in L MOORE, supra note
16, at 7.
19. For recent article concerning the contribution of Sir William Blackstone,
see Orth, Sir William Blackstone: Hero of the Common Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 155-59
(1980).
20. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 653-54 (1973).
21. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (7th ed.
1775).
22. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1-2 (1951).
23. Id. at 1, 2.
24. The common law procedures have been described as "very dilatory, incon-
venient, and unsatisfactory." 1 J. Story, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 442, at 416 (9th ed. 1866) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY]. Equity
procedures such as discovery, joinder, interpleader and the class action, were bet-
ter suited to complex litigation. D. KARLEN, CrvIL LITIGATION 217-20 (1978); 1
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY § 450 (9th ed. 1866). See also, E. MORGAN, THE
STUDY OF LAW 9-13 (2d ed. 1948). For an in-depth discussion of the English devel-
opment of the Court of Chancery, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIvm PROCEDURE
§§ 1.3-1.5, at 8-16 (2d ed. 1977).
often dismissed when the proper remedy was available at law.
Therefore, a single transaction could involve two suits, one to
hear the equitable claims and one to try the legal claims.25
At the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791,
the practice of the English Court of Chancery was in transition.2 6
The court was gradually moving away from the rule that disputed
issues of fact were generally, if not invariably, submitted to juries.
However, the transition was slow in taking place. Trial by jury
was the only mode of trial known at common law as late as 1854.27
Cases involving fraud serve to illustrate this point. In the case of
Webb v. Claverdon,28 decided in 1742, the court stated that a case
of fraud must be tried by a jury at law. Similarly, in Bates v.
Graves,29 a 1793 case, the Lord Chancellor held that the court
could not decide the validity of a will without submission of the
issue of fraud to a jury. In 1802, the case of Kemp v. Pryor3O in-
volved a fraud allegation in the sale of certain lead for export to
New York. The Chancellor stated, "The fraud imputed is cogniza-
ble at law; and must be found by a jury." 3 1 Thus English cases
involving fraud in 1791, were tried by a jury.
The arguments advanced for finding a precedent in English
common law for an exception to the right to trial by jury rely
heavily on two decisions: Clench v. Tomley,32 and Wedderburn v.
Pickering.33 In Wedderburn, an action disputing property bound-
aries, the court found that some cases were of "great complexity,
or otherwise, not capable of being conveniently tried before a
jury."3 4 The importance of this case must be iewed in light of
the rules established under the Judiciature Act of 1873 concerning
the merger of law and equity.35 It must also be remembered that
the Wedderburn decision was made in 1879, and that the seventh
amendment is construed in light of the English Common law as it
existed in 1791.
25. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 24, § 1.5, at 15-18.
26. See generally, Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh
Amendment: Jury Trial of Issue in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALE L.J. 999
(1974).
27. Zander, The Jury in England: Decline and Fall?, in RoscoE POUND AMERI-
CAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 29, 32
(1977).
28. 26 Eng. Rep. 656 (Ch. 1742).
29. 30 Eng. Rep. 636 (Ch. 1793).
30. 32 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ch. 1802).
31. Id. at 99.
32. 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603).
33. 13 Ch. D. 769 (1879).
34. Id. as quoted in Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
35. See discussion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
Ltd., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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The Clench decision, decided in 1603, stands alone as a possible
rationale for the creation of discretionary application of the right
to a jury trial. In that action, the Chancery enjoined an action at
law on the grounds that many jurors could not read the complex
writings upon which the decision was to be based.36 However, the
Clench decision should not be viewed as reflective of the English
common law in 1791, but as a single case decided in 1603. Al-
though the jury system and jurisdictional boundaries between
law and equity changed significantly between the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, 37 the Clench decision should be viewed
only as an aberration since complex actions were often heard in
the law courts during the seventeenth century.3 8 Further, the fact
that the decision is only a single page, raises questions as to its
inclusiveness. Prior to 1785, it was not infrequent for unofficial re-
ports to reflect merely "those parts of the opinion deemed by the
reporter to be useful to the lawyer."39
Before leaving Chancery procedure, it must be mentioned that
the action of account was a unique exception where equity was
sometimes permitted to take jurisdiction when accounts were
complex. 40 Account actions were among the most ancient forms
of common law suits, 4 1 and involved an accounting between plain-
tiff and defendant.42 Equity courts gradually began to supercede
the common law courts in complex actions of account, mostly as a
result of procedural distinctions between the two courts.43
An action of account was distinguishable from the other legal
actions and subject to certain specific requirements. An equity
court was permitted to take jurisdiction only when both parties
were subject to the accounting (mutual accounts) or if the equita-
ble discovery procedures were material to the relief sought." If
36. 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). The Court stated that a jury trial must be de-
nied since the case involved "books and deeds, of which the Court was better able
to judge than a jury of ploughmen ...." Id.
37. See Chesnin & Hazard, supra, note 26.
38. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARv. L. REV. 295, 300-03 (1892).
39. M. PRICE & H. BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 283 (1953).
40. Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad, 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
41. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY § 442 (9th ed. 1866).
42. H, McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 200 (2d ed.
1948). These actions included situations where the defendant was "plaintiffs bai-
liff, factor, partner, or a receiver of money to the use of plaintiff." Id.
43. See note 24 supra.
44. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 443-49, 458 (1886);
Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831).
these specific requirements were not met, equity would decline
jurisdiction in that "if under such circumstances the court were to
entertain the suit, it would merely administer the same functions
in the same way as a Court of Law would in the suit. In short, it
would act as a Court of Law."45
Those complex accounting actions which were heard in equity
courts usually fell under the concurrent jurisdiction of law and
equity.46 The Plaintiff could decide whether to proceed at law or
equity.47 In making such determinations, convenience was a ma-
jor consideration. 48 It is important to note that the discretion was
in the hands of the plaintiff and not the court, in deciding to pro-
ceed in equity without a jury. Today, the merger of law and eq-
uity has eliminated the concern regarding procedural
disadvantages and thereby erradicated the necessity for removing
accounting cases to equity jurisdiction except in very rare circum-
stances. 4 9
The above examination of Chancery procedure establishes that
at the time of the enactment of the seventh amendment in 1791,
the general practice was that all common law suits were tried
before a jury. If the seventh amendment required merely that
American courts look to the common law of England generally,
adopting the spirit rather than the fact, there might be some foun-
dation for permitting increasing judicial discretion in disallowing
jury trials. The use of juries in civil cases in England declined
sharply in the eighteenth and nineteen centuries. 50 Presently, the
jury has become virtually extinct in civil cases, with few excep-
tions.5 1 The Supreme Court, however, has traditionally taken a
static view of the historical test in interpreting the meaning of the
seventh amendment, looking only to English practice as of the
date of the adoption, 1791.52
45. J. Story, supra note 44, at 458.
46. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.25 (2d ed. 1978); 1 POMEROY, EQurrY Ju-
RISPRUDENCE §§ 170-74 (1918).
47. 5 MOORE, supra note 46, at 38.11 [6].
48. Shepard v. Brown, 66 Eng. Rep. 681 (CH. 1862). The court stated: "On
questions of account, Courts of Equity and Courts of law possess concurrent juris-
diction, and the decision as to the proper tribunal must be governed by considera-
tions of convenience." Id. at 681.
49. See text accompanying n. 90 infra.
50. Statistics indicate the sharp decline of juries in civil cases in England.
Lord Devlin, quoting the figures of the Lord Chancellor's Department as of 1956,
stated that "the proportion of jury trials is now 2 per cent or 3 per cent of the
whole." DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 182 (1956).
51. See, Zander, 'The Jury In England: Decline and Fall? supra note 27 at 29-
31.
52. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.-, 1, 48 (1937); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935).
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B. The Adoption of the Seventh Amendment
Trial by jury first came to North America when King James I
permitted the Virginia Company to establish the community of
Jamestown.5 3 The First Charter of Virginia (1606) provided that
the colonists have and enjoy "all Liberties, Franchises, and Immu-
nities . . .- 54 of Englishmen. Jury trial in civil cases came to be
seen as an important right of freemen and a symbol of rebellion
against English dominance.5 5 Judicial administration in courts of
general jurisdiction usually involved juries in civil actions, even
though the practices of the states varied widely as to the balanc-
ing of the jury verdict and judge opinion in resolving disputes.5 6
The influence of the English common law and the importance of
the right to jury trial in civil cases are illustrated by the language
of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, adopted in 1641;57 the
Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, adopted in
1677;58 and the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, adopted in
1682.59
Throughout the 1760s, the autonomy of the colonial courts in-
creased.60 The striving for independence and freedom from op-
pression was marked by the observation that "[tlhe right to trial
by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first
53. H. Hyman & C. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE
JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA at 24-25 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
54. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 44 (1959).
55. R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5 (1980).
56. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REV.
289, 299-320 (1966). This article examines the differing practices of the thirteen
original states.
57. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties was adopted by the General Court of
Massachusetts on December 10, 1641. Article 29 states: "In all Actions at law it
shall be the libertie of the plantiff and defendant by mutual consent to choose
whether they will be tryed by the Bench or by a Jurie [sic I. R. PERRY & J.
COOPER, supra note 54, at 151.
58. The Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey was adopted March
13, 1677, and chapter XVII made provision for trial by jury stating:
THAT no Proprietor, freeholder or inhabitant of the said Province of West
New Jersey, shall be deprived or condemned of life, limb, liberty, estate,
property or any ways hurt in his or their privileges, freedoms or
franchises, upon any account whatsoever, without a due tryal, and judg-
ment passed by twelve good and lawful men.
R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 54, at 185.
59. The Frame of Government of Pennsylvania was adopted April 25, 1682, and
article VII made provision for trial by jury. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 54,
at 217.
60. H. Hyman & C. Tarrant, ASPECTS OF AMERICAN TRIAL JURY HISTORY, in THE
JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 28 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
American state constitutions."61 All thirteen original states made
provision for the institution of civil jury trial.62 Virginia's Bill of
Rights enacted in 1776 stated, "That in controversies respecting
property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by
jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred."63
Maryland's constitution also emphasized that a man might not be
"deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the law of the land."64
The strong state support for jury trial, emphasized at the first
Congress of the American colonies in 1765,65 was a subject of
much debate and discourse at the Constitutional Convention in
1787.66 The correlation between jury trial and independence was
articulated by Patrick Henry: "Why do we love this trial by jury?
Because it prevents the hand of oppression from cutting you
off. '"67 Yet, when the federal constitution was enacted on March 4,
1789, the absence of a provision for trial by jury in civil cases was
noted with concern. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist stated
that "the objection to the plan of the convention ... is that rela-
tive to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury
in civil cases. 68 He also stated:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree on
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or
if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former re-
gard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government. 6 9
It was not, however, until the first ten amendments to the Con-
stitution became effective on December 15, 1791, that the right to
jury trial in civil cases was guaranteed to all citizens under the
seventh amendment.70
61. L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY -
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 281 (1963).
62. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN.
L. REV. 639, 655, n.49 (1973).
63. R. PERRY & J. COOPER, supra note 54, at 312.
64. Id. at 346, 348.
65. R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5 (1980).
66. For a discussion of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, see Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 657-67
(1973).
67. Patrick Henry made the statement at the Virginia Convention, June 20,
1788, as quoted in J. Van Dyke, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 7 (1977).
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 A. Hamilton 538 (National Home Library Founda-
tion, 1937) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 542-43.
70. For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding adoption of the seventh
amendment, see generally Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 725 (1973).
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The seventh amendment guarantee of a right to jury trial in
civil actions has been jealously guarded and vigorously protected
by the Supreme Court. The Court has held that "maintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies
so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care." 71
The very language of the amendment in stating that the right
"shall be preserved" anticipates and prohibits any restrictive judi-
cial interpretations.7 2 Criticism of the requirement for historical
inquiry has included concern that intricate examination of the
Chancery procedure may "reek unduly of the study,7 3 'if not of
the museum."'74 Nevertheless, in decision after decision, the
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the right to jury trial must be
preserved inviolate in all cases at common law.7 5
In recent years, the Supreme Court has enlarged the right to
jury trial by expanding the interpretation of the seventh amend-
ment and redefining which suits must be considered suits at com-
mon law. In considering those causes of action statutorily created
since 1791, the Court has held that the seventh amendment is not
directly applicable, and that the legislature has considerable lati-
tude in deciding whether there shall be a right to jury trial.76
However, in those instances, where the cause of action is analo-
gous to a common law action, the Court has held that the legisla-
71. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
72. The language "shall be preserved" has been uniformly interpreted as re-
quiring that the right to jury trial be afforded in all cases where such a right ex-
isted at the time of the adoption of the seventh amendment. 293 U.S. at 476.
73. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1961).
74. Id. at 59 (Clark, J. dissenting).
75. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
76. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Congress
may provide for administrative finding of unfair labor practice under the Wagner
Act without impairing the seventh amendment); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (Congress may
expand the role of administrative agencies in the enforcement of federal regula-
tory statutes without impairing the seventh amendment).
It should be noted that the legislature might abolish a common law remedy and
substitute an entirely new system of compensation administered by a board or
commission without resort to court or jury. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U.S. 219 (1917).
ture probably will not be able to eliminate the right to jury trial.77
Further, if the legislature is silent as to the right to jury trial, the
Court has required that the nearest historical analogy be ap-
plied.7 8
Thus, in 1974, the Supreme Court held that the seventh amend-
ment requires that a right to jury trial be guaranteed in suits
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.79 In the case of Curtis
v. Loether, an action enforcing statutory rights, the Court stated:
By common law, [the Framers] meant ... not merely suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits
in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined .... In a
just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all
suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.80
This holding reiterates the importance of the jury trial guarantee
and the necessity for expansion beyond the common law forms of
actions. Similarly in Pernell v. Southall Realty,81 the Court re-
quired in those cases involving actions which did not have a di-
rect counterpart at common law, an inquiry be made into the
remedies sought to determine if they were traditionally provided
in an action at law in 1791.82 Thus, the importance of the right to
a jury trial was reaffirmed by the judicial expansion of that right
to those actions not traditionally within the bounds of the amend-
ment.
The Supreme Court has also strengthened the seventh amend-
ment's guarantees by applying an expanded historical test, taking
into account the availability of modern procedures. In the leading
case of Beacon Theatres v. Westover,83 an action for injunction
and declaratory relief, the plaintiff sought to establish that it had
not violated the antitrust laws. The Court held that the defend-
ant's counterclaim for treble damages entitled the defendant to a
jury trial under the seventh amendment. Reasoning that the ade-
quacy of a legal remedy must be viewed "not by precedents de-
77. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). See also: Olearchick v. American Steel Foundaries, 73 F.
Supp. 273 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (Fair Labor Standards Act suit for overtime compensa-
tion was held triable to a jury); Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp.
37, 38 (D. Mass. 1939) (the United States patent statutes permit a jury in an action
for damages for the infringement of a patent, 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 1954);
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 162 Fed. 354, 357 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (antitrust case
involving treble damages to a jury).
78. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913) (fraud action to cancel naturali-
zation certificate).
79. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
80. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) cited in Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
81. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
82. Id. at 375.
83. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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cided under discarded procedures, but in light of the remedies
now made available, ' 84 the Court determined that resort to equi-
table relief was not necessary. While the injunctive proceeding
has been tried at equity, historically, "equity has always acted
only when legal remedies were inadequate."85 Here, the Court
found that the legal remedy was adequate in light of the compul-
sory counterclaim rules, the limitation on voluntary dismissals
without prejudice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the remedies under the Declaratory Judgment Act.86 Therefore,
when both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single
case, the right to jury trial was held to be so important that it
should not be lost through prior determination of equitable
claims.8 7
In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,88 the Court further reinforced the
importance of the seventh amendment guarantees. The com-
plaint in that action sought an injunction against the use of a
trade name, an accounting and damages. The district court
viewed the entire action as equitable and denied the demand for
a jury trial. The Supreme Court followed the approach of Beacon
Theatres and held that the historical rules should be applied in
light of modern procedure. The Court rejected the equitable
clean-up doctrine,89 which permitted a court to decide legal issues
which were incidental to an essentially equitable cause of action.
84. Id. at 507.
85. Id. at 509.
86. The Court reasoned that the adequacy of the legal remedy and the possi-
bility of irreparable harm had to be determined only with reference to the reme-
dies made available under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 42(b) and 57. 359 U.S. at 506-07. For a discussion of the impact of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Beacon Theatres, see Note, Jury Trial in
Complex Litigation, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 335-37 (1978); McCoid, Procedural
Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
87. 359 U.S. at 511. The dissent by Justice Stewart disagreed with this conten-
tion and stated that the district court should not be compelled to try the counter-
claim first. 359 U.S. at 513 (Stewart, J. dissenting). For comments on the
reasoning of the Court, see Note, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV.
84, 189-90 (1959).
88. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
89. See, Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury. A Suggested Orientation, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1951) for a discussion of equitable clean-up. The Court stated:
"Since these issues [the factual issues related to the question of whether these
has been a breach of contract] are common with those upon which the respon-
dents' claim to equitable relief is based, the legal claims involved in the action
must be determined prior to any final court determination of respondents' equita-
ble claims." 369 U.S. at 479.
The Court also held that procedural developments such as merger
of law and equity reduce the inadequacy of legal remedies,
thereby broadening the right to a jury trial. The opinion stated
that a suit need not be basically legal in order for the right to trial
by jury to attach. Rather, the right attaches to each legal issue
within a case.90 The claim that the request for an accounting, an
historically equitable remedy, should defeat the defendant's de-
mand for jury trial, was dismissed because the "prerequisite to
the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting, like all
other equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon Thea-
tres, the absence of an adequate remedy at law."9 1 In order to de-
feat the right to jury trial, the plaintiff would be required to prove
that the accounts were so complicated that a jury could not satis-
factorily unravel them.92 The Court noted, however, that such a
burden would be hard to meet, since an exception "'should sel-
dom be made, and if at all only when unusual circumstances ex-
ist.'"93 The existence of provisions for a master under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure94 made it "a rare case" in which jury
trial might be denied.95
Both the Beacon Theatres and the Dairy Queen cases recognize
that the strict historical test may be relaxed to provide the right
of a jury trial where they did not previously exist. Under the cri-
teria of those two cases, an action seeking legal as well as histori-
cally equitable remedies may now be tried at law under the
seventh amendment guarantees.
90. The Court quoted the language from Beacon Theatres stating that where
both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, "only under the
most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible proce-
dures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 369 U.S. at
472-73.
91. 369 U.S. at 478. It is important to note that the Plaintiff in Dairy Queen
claimed it was not seeking money damages, but rather an accounting which is his-
torically equitable. Id. at 477. The Court held that the availability of a constitu-
tional right did not turn upon the wording of the pleading. Id. at 477-78. The Court
found that a jury could decide the case. Id. at 479.
92. Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887), as
cited in Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478.
93. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258 (1957) as cited in Dairy
Queen, 369 U.S. at 478.
94. The Court referred to the provisions of rule 53 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which permits the appointment of masters to assist juries in com-
plex cases: (b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not
the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated .... Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
95. 369 U.S. at 478. For further discussion of Dairy Queen see Note, Unfit for
Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation and The Seventh Amendment Right
of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C. L. REV. 511, 515-16 (1978); Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70
NW. U.L. REV. 486, 497-99 (1975).
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Finally, in Ross v. Bernhard,96 the Court again departed from
the strict historical test. In expanding the seventh amendment
guarantee, the Court ruled that a shareholder derivative suit, a
traditional cause of action in equity,97 could be tried to a jury.
The Court focused on those issues which the corporation, had it
been suing on its own behalf, would have been entitled to try
before a jury.9 8 Justice White, referring to the Beacon Theatres
and Dairy Queen decisions, stated that the seventh amendment
guarantee depends upon the characterization of issues rather
than the character of the overall action:99
[W] here equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, there is
a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not be infringed either
by trying the legal issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court
trial of a common issue existing betwen the claims. 10 0
The right to jury trial was upheld since the underlying issues and
remedies in Ross were "legal." Having thus overcome the difficul-
ties of the historical test, Ross addressed the further problem of
trying to determine the nature of the issue. Footnote ten of the
Ross case ennunciated some factors to be considered: "first, the
pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the
remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of
juries."101
Justice White's opinion, in analyzing the nature of the issue,
96. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
97. Prior to Ross, shareholder derivative suits were seen as a cause of action
in equity. See e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Rich-
land v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 279 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
98. The Court stated: "We hold that the right to jury trial attaches to those
issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it had been suing on its
own right, would have been entitled to a jury." 396 U.S. at 532-33.
99. 396 U.S. at 538. See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
100. 396 U.S. at 537-38.
101. 396 U.S. at 538. n. 10. The meaning of this footnote has received a great
deal of attention. See Pivonka, The Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1003, 1009-12 (1979); Note, Unfit for Jury Determination:
Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20
B.C. L. REV. 511, 517 (1979); Ell, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Com-
mercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 747, 794 (1978);
Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Complex Litigation, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329,
339-43 (1978); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irra-
tionality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U.L. REV. 486, 523-24 (1975); Sower,
"Complicated Issues" v. The Right to a Jury Trial: A Procedural Remnant in Ken-
tucky Law Raises Constitutional Problems, 3 N.KY. ST. L.REv. 173 (1975); Note,
Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 18 YALE L.J.
112 (1971); COMMENT, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross. The Seventh
Amendment, The Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URn.
L. 459 (1971).
made no reference to the competence of juries to handle complex
securities claims. The Court utilized only the first two portions of
the test and rested its opinion squarely on the seventh amend-
ment analysis traditionally employed. The departure from a strict
historical test in Ross seems to be indicative of a strong federal
policy favoring jury trials.102
Since the Ross decision in 1970, the Supreme Court has com-
pletely ignored the test articulated in Ross. In Curtis v.
Loether,10 3 a private damage suit brought in federal court under
the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1968, the Court enforced the seventh amendment right to jury
trial under the reasoning that the right and remedies were of the
sort typically enforced in an action at law.104
Then in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 0 5 a summary eviction proce-
dure in the District of Columbia, the Court held that when Con-
gress provides statutory remedies analogous to those recognized
at common law "it must preserve to parties their right to a jury
trial."' 0 6 In Lorillard v. Pons,0 7 a case involving a statute provid-
ing for jury trial in a private civil action for lost wages under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Court failed
to mention the limitations of juries as a possible restriction on
seventh amendment guarantees, even though the court of appeals
had cited Ross.108
Even those cases denying a right to jury trial have not applied
the Ross test. In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Com-
mission,0 9 Mr. Justice White, who also wrote the majority opin-
ion in Ross, failed to mention the third portion of the Ross test in
finding that Congress had the power to create a new cause of ac-
tion, not recognized at common law, for civil penalties enforceable
in an administrative proceeding without violating the seventh
amendment.l" 0
Finally, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,"' in holding that the
use of offensive collateral estoppel predicated upon a prior court
102. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974).
103. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
104. Id. at 194.
105. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
106. Id. at 383.
107. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
108. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1977), aJd, 434 U.S. 575
(1978).
109. 430 U.S. 442 (1977). For a discussion of Atlas, see Kirst, Administrative
Penalties and the Civil Jury. The Supreme Court's Assault on the Seventh Amend-
ment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (1978).
110. 430 U.S. at 453.
111. 439 U.S. 322 (1979); For a discussion see Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery
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trial did not violate the seventh amendment, the Court expressly
referred to the historical test without mentioning Ross.112 It is
significant that the majority opinion included a discussion of the
procedural devices which have been developed since 1791, and
have been held constitutional despite seventh amendment chal-
lenges.1 3 Had the Ross test been considered a test of constitu-
tional magnitude, it would be incongruous for the Court to have
omitted it from this discussion.114
III. RECENT DECISIONS CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF COMPLEXITY
The failure of the Supreme Court to apply the Ross test to the
facts in any subsequent seventh amendment decisions, raises
Co.: The Seventh Amendment and Collateral Estoppel, 66 CAL. L. REV. 861 (1978);
Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEB. L. REV. 86 (1978).
112. 439 U.S. at 333-37.
113. 439 U.S. at 336.
114. Parklane Hosiery is one of a few Supreme Court cases repeatedly cited as
indicative of a willingness by the Supreme Court to restrict the scope of the sev-
enth amendment. The cases normally cited are the following: Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offensive collateral estoppel case); Atlas Roofing
Co. v. Occupational Safety Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (administrative pro-
ceeding without a jury); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (bankruptcy ac-
tion); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (directed verdict); NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (statutory proceeding); Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (retrial on issue of dam-
ages only); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 (1902) (sum-
mary judgment).
It should be noted that the actions below do not fall into the classification of
suits at common law. Atlas Roofing, Katchen, and Jones & Laughlin were all ac-
tions enforcing statutory rights in special forums where juries are not usually em-
ployed such as administrative tribunals and bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy
actions have been recognized to be inherently equitable. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336-
37. Administrative tribunals decide cases which were statutorily created and are
not suits at common law or of the nature of suits at common law. Atlas Roofing,
430 U.S. at 453; Jones & Laughlin 301 U.S. at 48-49.
Parklane, Galloway, Gasoline Products, and Fidelity & Deposit can be distin-
guished from those cases requiring a jury trial in that the cases did not require
fact finding. In Parklane and Gasoline Products, the issues which might properly
be submitted to a jury were previously adjudicated, and the Court refused to per-
mit relitigation. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 336 n. 23; Gasoline Products, 283 U.S. at 498-
99. The last two cases, Galloway and Fidelity & Deposit are distinctive since
there existed no issue of fact at all. Rather, the cases were resolved through a di-
rected verdict, Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. at 388-93; and a summary judg-
ment, Fidelity & Deposit, Co. of Md. v. United States 187 U.S. at 319. These cases
are not properly relied upon as support for the elimination of jury trials in cases
where there exist many issues of fact to be decided, since the resolution of factual
issues is the central purpose of the civil jury.
questions concerning the constitutional status of the test. The
Court's silence as to whether or not a new test has been formu-
lated for deciding the right to jury trial under the seventh amend-
ment, and the parameters of such a test, has caused considerable
confusion, reflected in lower court opinions.
There have been four recent decisions by federal district"15
courts which have denied jury demands made under the seventh
amendment on the rationale that the factual complexity and the
massive size of the litigation, impair the ability of a jury to reach
a competent decision. The Ross decision has been held to be the
legal justification for such findings.
Initially, lower courts reacted less favorably to the Ross deci-
sion as a limitation of seventh amendment rights. For example, in
Tights, Inc. v. Stanley,116 a case involving alleged patent infringe-
ment and a claim for money damages, the court refused to deny a
jury trial even though it was charged that patent cases as a class
are too complex to be tried by a jury.l"7 The court distinguished
complex issues concerning liability from complex equitable ac-
counting damages and held that the former must be tried to a
jury.li8
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered
the applicability of the Ross test to complex litigation in Hyde
Properties v. McCoy.119 That case was an interpleader action in-
volving the solvency of a corporation and corporate accounting
procedures. 120 The opinion of the court of appeals held that a
non-jury trial was called for,' 2' but the attention given to the third
portion of the Ross test was extremely brief and failed to indicate
whether complexity is sufficient, standing alone, to invoke equita-
ble jurisdiction. This same difficultly arose in Prudential Oil
115. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702
(S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.
Wash. 1976). See discussion of these cases, footnotes 125-50 & accompanying text
infra.
116. 441 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
117. Id. at 340.
118. The court stated:
If the scope of equitable accounting is to be expanded to encompass cases
felt to be too complex or esoteric for trial to a jury, we think that expan-
sion must come from the Supreme Court. We do not construe any lan-
guage in the Dairy Queen opinion to sanction this further limitation of the
right to jury trial.
Id. at 341.
119. 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974).
120. Id. at 306.
121. Id.
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Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,122 a breach of contract action
where discussion of the practical abilities and limitations of jurors
was limited to one paragraph, and jury trial was granted.a23
The first case in which an otherwise valid jury demand was
stricken was In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation,124 an ac-
tion for alleged violation of securities laws against an acquiring
company.125 Analyzing the case in light of the Ross test,126 the
district court held that the jury demand could be stricken without
violating the seventh amendment.X27 The court was influenced by
a four to six month estimated trial time and accounting problems
in excess of a billion dollars. The court found "at some point, it
must be recognized that the complexity of a case may exceed the
ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed and capable
manner."12 8
The following year, the case of In re United States Financial Se-
curities Litigation,129 was decided in which, again, all jury de-
mands were stricken. The court noted that intricate accounting
problems were central to the resolution of the case, and compli-
cated accounting problems traditionally were within the equity
jurisdiction of the court.130 Reasoning that neither Beacon Thea-
tres nor Dairy Queen eliminated equity jurisdiction over account-
ing cases beyond the competence of the jury to decide, even with
the assistance of a special master pursuant to rule 53(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concluded that there
was no entitlement to a jury trial. It was held that a lay jury
would be "singularly unqualified" to decide the case and that
therefore the legal remedy was inadequate.13'
The case of Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.,132 was a com-
122. 392 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 546 F.2d 469 (2d
Cir. 1976).
123. Id. at 1023.
124. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
125. For an in-depth discussion of the issues in the Boise Cascade case, see
Comment, The Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 16 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1003, 1012-14 (1979).
126. Id. at 104.
127. Id. at 105.
128. Id. at 104.
129. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.Cal. 1977).
130. Id. at 707, 709, 712-13.
131. Id. at 713. For a more in-depth discussion, see Note, Unfit for Jury Determi-
nation: Complex Civil Litigation and The Seventh Amendment Right of Trial By
Jury, 20 B.C. L. REV. 511, 521-22 (1979).
132. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
plicated antitrust action in which the issues were all recognized
by the court to be legal under the first two portions of the Ross
test. Nonetheless, the court held that the length of trial and com-
plexity of the issues required striking the jury demand: "to hold
that a jury trial is required in this case would be to hold that the
Seventh Amendment gives a single party at its choice the right to
an irrational verdict."'133
Most recently, in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International
Business Machines,134 another complex antitrust case, a motion to
stike the jury demand was denied, the case was litigated for five
months, and at the end a mistrial was declared due to jury dead-
lock.135 The judge subsequently reviewed his earlier decision and
ordered the case tried in equity, in the event of retrial,136 in light
of two factors: first, the difficulty for the jury in comprehending
the concepts at trial, 137 and second, the cost to the litigants and
the government of a trial of this complexity. 38
There are two basic contentions which are central to the rea-
soning of the above four cases. First, the Ross test is the correct
statement of law, derived from traditional authority, and equity
has inherent power to order non-jury trials in complex civil
cases.139 Secondly, that in the absence of such an exception to
the seventh amendment, considerations of fairness and due proc-
ess compel non-jury trials in situations where a jury cannot make
a competent and rational decision in the opinion of the court.140
The remainder of this article will concentrate on these specific al-
legations and concerns. The constitutionality of these decisions
rests on their interpretation of seventh amendment history, the
finding that juries are incompetent to decide complex cases, and
the nature of the due process guarantees.
It is important to note that recent decisions concerning the sev-
enth amendment have considered the arguments advanced in the
above cases and found them non-persuasive. In Radial Lip
Machine, Inc. v. International Carbide Corp.,141 a patent infringe-
133. Id. at 71. For a more in-depth discussion see generally Note, Constitutional
Law - Seventh Amendment - Right to A Jury Trial in Complex Litigation - Bern-
stein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., Wis. L. REv. 920 (1979).
134. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
135. Id. at 444.
136. The deadlock of the jury prompted the court to declare a mistrial, and
thereafter, the court granted IBM's motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 444.
137. Id. at 447.
138. Id. at 448.
139. See 79 F.R.D. at 67; 458 F. Supp. at 445-46; 75 F.R.D. at 710; 420 F. Supp. at
104.
140. See 79 F.R.D. at 71; 458 F. Supp. at 447-48; 75 F.R.D. at 712-13; 420 F. Supp. at
104.
141. 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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ment case, the court declined to grant consitutional significance to
the Ross test. The court interpreted the Ross test, which requires
consideration of "the nature of the issue to be tried rather than
the character of the overall action," 142 as condemning any applica-
tion which might "characterize a class of actions as creating a
right to trial by jury."143 It further found that a case-by-case ap-
proach, characterizing an action on the basis of complexity, defied
the creation of manageable judicial standards. An ad hoc applica-
tion of the seventh amendment is unsuitable because the Ross
opinion gives no indication of how complex a case must be before
a jury demand may be struck. Without such guidelines, a judge
would be left with unfettered discretion to grant or deny jury
trial. The unpredictability and amorphous standard would inevi-
tably result in "dilution of the right to a jury trial."'"
The reasoning in Radial Lip has been adopted and echoed as
recently as 1979, when in American Can Co. v. Dart Industries,145
a patent case, the motion to stike the plaintiff's jury demand was
denied on the grounds that Ross did not create a broad exception
to the seventh amendment. The opinion stated that complexity is
often a result of the failure of counsel to adequately prepare their
cases in a comprehensible manner. In noting that such difficult
cases as medical malpractice, products liability and criminal anti-
trust actions are daily before juries, he concluded:
It would serve the bar well to look to clean its own house and improve its
performance before clamoring to abolish or diminish the cherished right
to trial by jury. If we are to strive to improve the quality of factual presen-
tation in our courts we must strike at the cause of the disease, not its
symptoms.
14 6
Similarly, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co.,147 a complex antitrust action, the court considered the
question of whether the plaintiff's jury demands should be struck
on the grounds of complexity under the Ross test. The court here,
however, went further than other courts and ruled that the Ross
test is not of constitutional magnitude. The court found that Ross
142. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
143. 76 F.R.D. at 227. The court held that "[tIhe portion of the Ross test which
weighs the practical abilities and limitations of juries contemplates a general anal-
ysis of the problems typically presented by those claims, not a specific case-by-
case analysis of the complexity of the litigation."
144. Id. at 228.
145. American Can Co. v. Dart Industries, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1007 (1979).
146. Id. at 1008.
147. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., 478 F. Supp.
889 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
"'may not be read as requiring or permitting the consideration of
'the practical abilities and limitations of juries' in determining
whether the constitutional right to trial by jury extends to mat-
ters committed . . . to federal district court."148 Rather, the court
concluded that the Ross test was never considered by the
Supreme Court to be a test for seventh amendment issues, the
test was unworkable, and the application of the test would conflict
with policies underlying the role of the jury in civil actions in our
courts.
14 9
Thus we have seen that the possible interpretation of the mean-
ing of Ross is a double-edged sword. In light of Chancery proce-
dure, circumstances surrounding the adoption of the seventh
amendment, and judicial treatment of the seventh amendment
prior to the Ross case, it seems clear that any exception to a right
of a jury trial for complex cases, other than complex accounting
actions, would have to be derived from the third portion of the
Ross test. Whether the Supreme Court even elaborates on the
meaning of the footnote or adopts it as a seventh amendment test
will probably rest on the necessity for such an exception. It is
therefore beneficial to spend some time considering the difficul-
ties inherent in complex litigation and the possible incompetence
of juries in deciding such cases.
IV. JURY COMPOSITION, COMPREHENSION AND DELAY
With the increase in the time required for trial in federal dis-
trict courts, 5 0 and the increase in the filings of private antitrust
suits,' 5 ' the question arises of whether or not the jury has become
an anachronism in the twentieth century. The desire to stream-
line the administration of justice and reduce the costs of judicial
administration has led to the adoption of six-member juries, 5 2
non-unanimous verdicts, 153 and judge-conducted voir dire.' 54
148. Id. at 78, 334-35.
149. Id.
150. Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his recent speech that the total
number of trial days in protracted civil cases, those lasting more than a month,
have more than doubled in the period from 1970 to 1978, with 1017 trial days in
1970, now measured against 2195 trial days in 1978. Address by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Conference of State Chief Justices, at Flagstaff, Arizona (August 1, 1979).
151. There was an increase of 9.4% in private antitrust suits filed in 1976, over
those filed in 1975. [19761 Drv. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 191
(Table 27). There were 20 federal civil jury trials concerning contract, antitrust
and securities violations in 1976, which lasted over 19 days. Id. at 332-33 (Table C-
8).
152. See Williams v. Florida, 339 U.S. 78 (1970); Colegrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
155-56 (1973).
153. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
154. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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Whether the time has come to strike again at the domain of the
jury seems to be very much before us.155
Before addressing the actual workings of the jury system, a
slight deviation from the problematical concerns into the nature
of the jury system seems appropriate. Joseph H. Choate, in ad-
dressing the American Bar Association stated: "The truth is, how-
ever, that the jury system is so fixed as an essential part of our
political institution . . . that there can be no substantial ground
for fear that any of us will live to see the people consent to give it
up."156
United States District Court Judge Charles W. Joiner has been
a strong advocate of the civil jury.157 In balancing the relative
merits of a system with and without a jury, he points to the tradi-
tional role of the jury in representing the public, 158 providing a
system of internal checks and balances between judge and
jury,15 9 making fair and accurate application of general rules and
standards of law' 60 without danger of prejudice, permitting the
parties trial according to the conscience of the community161 and
controlling an ever expanding bureaucracy in the dispute resolu-
tion process. 162
In representing the community, the jury has the important role
of educating members of the community to the law. As Alexis de
Tocqueville stated, "Thus the jury, which is the most energetic
means of making the people rule, is also the most efficacious
means of teaching it to rule well."163 The law requires community
wide acceptance and comprehension. Suggestion that the new
age of computer technology and scientific advancement alter the
need to make the law comprehensible to a jury, or warrant the in-
tervention of experts such as judges or masters, seems to over-
155. The controversy concerning civil jury trials has even been recognized by
Time Magazine which suggested that the elimination of juries in civil trials might
lead to better use of judicial resources in complex cases. Judging the Judges,
TIME, Aug. 20, 1979, at 54.
156. Sacks, Preservation of the Civil Jury, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 76, 78 (1965).
157. See generally, C. Joiner, Perspectives on the Function and Value of the Jury
in America from the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Simon ed. 1975). C.
JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY, (2d. reprinting 1977).
158. C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY, 24-25 (1977).
159. Id. at 14-20.
160. Id. at 25-35.
161. Id. at 35-38.
162. Id. at 9, 14-20.
163. De Tocqueville, Causes Which Mitigate the Tyranny of Majority in the
United States in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 214 (Henry Steele Commager ed. 1953).
look this important role of jury trial. Chief Justice Burger's
concern that the law and litigation have changed substantially
since the adoption of the seventh amendment, 164 might be an-
swered by Judge Joiner as follows:
The developments in science and the advance in engineering are changing
the size and character of problems placed before the courts. Problems are
becoming more complex and larger in scope, making wise solutions even
more imperative than in the past. With the slingshot and the buggy, wis-
dom and community acceptance were important ingredients in dispute
resolution; with the gun and automobile they are imperative. 16 5
In providing a system of checks and balances, the judge and
jury have traditionally complemented one another by integrating
legal expertise with community common sense. The procedural
devices available to the judge166 have guarded against unreasona-
ble and unwarranted verdicts. The jury infuses the litigation with
community wisdom to balance against the opinions of legal ex-
perts. Mr. Justice Hunt wrote of the balance:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of educa-
tion and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning
consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard ... these sit
together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to
the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judg-
ment thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one
man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts
thus occuring than can a single judge. 16 7
In making determinations based upon the law, it is interesting
to note that the jury is often called upon to apply standards relat-
ing to common sense. Legal language is permeated with the
words "reasonable," "ordinary, reasonable prudent man," "rea-
sonable notice, .... reasonable time" and similar phrases. The very
language of the law, therefore, calls for the wisdom of laymen,
rather than experts. It has been said that "[t] he jury is to the in-
side technical world of our common law system a representative
of that outside sense, and outside animation."' 68
Thus, after noting the political, philosophical and legal role of
juries, the next inquiry must center on the practical limitations
which have focused so much concern on the future of jury trials
in complex civil actions. Frustrations with the workings of the
jury system are certainly not new. An attack on the jury system
in the American Bar Association Journal in 1924 stated: "Too long
has the effete and sterile jury system been permitted to tug at the
throat of the nation's judiciary as it sinks under the smothering
164. See text accompanying footnote 6 supra.
165. C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY, 12 (1977).
166. See text accompanying notes 197-216 infra.
167. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).
168. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (7th ed. 1956) as quoted in C.
JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY, 121, 124 (1977).
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deluge of the obloquy of those it was designed to serve."169 These
sentiments have increased as frustrations mount over the new on-
slaught of complex litigation.
A. Jury Selection Process
The complexity of litigation has increased concern over the dif-
ficulty of impaneling individuals competent to resolve the com-
plex factual issues presented in the new cases. It has been
suggested that only experienced business and professional per-
sons are capable of deciding complex economic or scientific ques-
tions.170 Those individuals competent to understand the issues
are felt to be eliminated in the jury selection process, resulting in
a jury that is rarely a true cross-section of the community.'17
Even if competent jurors are not eliminated, there are other
problems which are seen as impeding their abilty to serve. First,
the belief that few jurors can afford to serve for an extended pe-
riod of time. The direct negative correlation between protracted
litigation and empaneling a representative jury was recognized in
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc.,172 wherein the four month
estimated trial time caused the court to conclude that "it would
be impossible to empanel a representative jury in this case,
whose verdict would enjoy the appearance of fairness."173 The
present compensation for jurors in federal courts is thirty (30)
dollars a day, plus travel and subsistence allowance.174 Compen-
sation from employers is often limited to a period as low as two
weeks.17 5 Thus, the protracted nature of complex cases brings
hardship upon the jurors and, in one court's opinion, makes jury
service "beyond the practical limitations of the human being who
would be asked to serve."1 76
Secondly, many jurors dislike the prolonged intrusion into their
169. Sebille, Trial by Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A. J. 53, 55 (1924) re-
printed in, H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY 5 (1966).
170. See comments of Chief Justice Burger, text accompanying note 6 supra.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) requires that a jury be selected at random from a
fair cross-section of the community. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in
such a selection process, see THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM supra note 27, at 72.
172. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
173. Id. at 70.
174. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1871 (West. Supp. 1979) sets the compensation for jurors at
$30.00 per day.
175. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 114-15 (1977).
176. This conclusion was reached in In re United States Financial Securities
Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 713-14 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (two year estimated trial time).
lives. Resentment of the time taken from work, family or friends
is hardly beneficial in the reaching of a competent and rational
decision.177 Therefore, judges have a tendency to excuse those
who request it on the grounds that such persons will not be a
good juror and would serve to the detriment of the court and liti-
gants. 78 These preliminary excusals have caused one court to ob-
serve that "a basic purpose of the jury, the determination of facts
by impartial minds of diverse backgrounds, is defeated if a sizable
and significant portion of the community must be excluded from
service." 179
The imbalance resulting from the early stages is felt to be rein-
forced during the challenge stage. Lawyers are commonly known
to exercise peremptory challenges for the purpose of eliminating
jurors who possess education or expertise for fear that they might
bias the jury with their knowledge 80 Thus, it would appear that
attorneys seek to empanel those least equipped to decide the
cases.
B. Resolution of Complex Factual Issues
The resolution of the factual issues in complex litigation is fre-
quently thought to be beyond the ability of laymen. Those cases
striking the jury demand involved extensive analysis of docu-
ments, expert testimony, charts, graphs, and other visual aids. In
In re United States Financial Securities Litigation,181 the jury
was faced with 24,000 documents, and 100,000 pages of documen-
tary evidence. 82 The burden of comprehending and retaining all
that evidence was held to be too great for the jury.183 The frustra-
177. Richert, Juror's Attitudes Toward Jury Service, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 233, 244
(1977).
178. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (1978), a complex antitrust
and patent action, over fifty percent of the jurors were excused for reasons relat-
ing to hardships in serving the estimated six month trial time. See Note, The Right
to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 779 (1978).
179. In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (1976). The
court noted that the limited number of available employed persons "suggests that
at least the appearance of fairness would be diminished, if not eliminated." Id.
180. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 152-60 (1977); See also, Burns &
Furth, The Anatomy of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement - A Law
Professor's Tape Talk With Plaintiffs Trial Counsel, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 865, 880-81
(1974). It has been noted by several judges that the above complications "defeat
the purpose of the jury system, which was to have a cross-sectional jury of one's
peers." 1977 Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the United
States, Transcript of Proceedings, at 29 (Sept. 9, 1977), id.
181. 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
182. Id. at 707.
183. Id. Concern over the ability of twelve laymen to make accurate factual
findings is reflected in the writings of Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School who
stated: "The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should any-
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tion of attempting to resolve complex factual issues was articu-
lated by the foreman of the jury in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp.
v. International Business Machines Corp.,8 4 who stated, "If you
can find a jury that's both a computer technician, a lawyer, an
economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you could have
a qualified jury."185
C. Extensive Legal Instructions
The complexity of the factual issues, and the protracted nature
of the trial is often felt to be complicated by the need for lengthy
instructions to the jury.186 The more complex the action, the
longer it may take to instruct the jury on the law. The fact that a
judge can often review the law and record, while the jury is usu-
ally limited to oral instructions at the beginning of trial, raises
concern as to the competence of the jury's verdict. 187 While some
authors have expressed concern, others believe in the inherent
competence of the jury verdict claiming that:
sometimes the jury's common sense perceptions, considerations of fair-
ness to the defendant, on appraisal of the law (in contrast to the judge's
statement of it) are so weighty that they justify departure from the re-
quirement that the jury defer to the judge's instructions. 1 8 8
Departure from instructions for common sense reasons is a part
of the innate character of the jury process and usually tolerated
one think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for
their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding contro-
versies between persons?" 1962-63 HARVARD L. ScH. DEAN'S REP. 5-6 quoted in
O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases?, 58 ILL. B.J. 796, 800 (1970). The greater the
factual complexity of a case, the greater the concern of those who doubt the fact-
finding capacity of jurors generally. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TIAL 118, 179 (1973).
184. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
185. Id. at 447. In Prosser, Book Review, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 556 (1955) he ex-
presses concern about the effectiveness of the verdict in personal injury cases
"when twelve inexperienced, innocent, and often ignorant and uneducated men
and women become the target of so elaborate a plot, a preparation and a produc-
tion [by certain counsel]." Id. at 558-59.
186. See comments of Justice Burger, note 7 supra.
187. It has been argued that:
The feats of memory required of jurors are prodigious. Applicable legal
rules are announced only after and not before the evidence is introduced.
So far as the jurors are concerned, the litigants' competing factual ver-
sions are presented in a non-legal vacuum. The successful integration of
the facts with the law long after the facts have been presented and many
of them forgotten is doubtless often impossible.
Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 392
(1954).
188. Kadish and Kadish, THE INSTrrurrIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT, IN LAW, Jus-
TICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SocIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 311 (1977).
as being implicit in the nature of jury trial. The departure, how-
ever, usually connotes a conscious decision not to adhere to the
instructions. The concern in complex actions is that the instruc-
tions are never understood, or are forgotten, because of their vo-
luminous nature and presentation.
D. Length of Trial
The final area of judicial concern is that the protracted nature
of the complex litigation will impair the ability of the jurors to un-
derstand and remember the evidence presented.189 Unusually
long estimated trial times have been considered as a factor in
cases denying jury trials.190 The rationale for striking the jury de-
mand rests on the theory that there is a limit to the capacity of
individuals to comprehend and retain information. Jurors re-
quired to sit for weeks listening to foreign subjects of a highly
technical nature may find it beyond their capacity to render a ver-
dict based on the law and the evidence.
One argument advanced for the elimination of jury trials in
complex litigation is that the trial by judge is normally shorter
and less expensive than jury trials.19' The Supreme Court had
held that there is not an inconsistency between the demand for a
jury trial by right and the desire for speedy trial.192 The need or
desire for a rapid litigation should not preclude a party from exer-
cising seventh amendment rights. Yet, as the cost of litigation in-
creases, with millions of dollars at stake, 93 such considerations
may play an increasingly stronger role in the debate over the fu-
ture of jury trials.
V. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN JURY TRIALS
Having examined some of the most common complaints against
the use of juries in complex litigation, it seems appropriate to dis-
cuss the ways in which a jury can be assisted in reaching a com-
189. See comments of Justice Burger, note 7 supra. See also, J. FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL 118 (1973): "The longer the trial lasts, the larger the scanning crowds, the
more intensely counsel draw the lines of conflict, the more solemn the judge, the
harder it becomes for the jury to restrain their reason from somersault." Id.
190. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machine
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (five month trial); In re United States
Financial Securities Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (estimated trial of
two years or more); In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 101
(W.D. Wash. 1976) (four to six month estimated trial time).
191. Zander, The Jury in England: Decline and Fall?, in THE AMERICAN JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 27 at 52.
192. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974).
193. The SCM litigation has cost the litigants in the area of five to ten million
dollars per year. See, Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commer-
cial Litigation and The Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 786 (1978).
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petent verdict. In the interest of reaching a fair decision, the
burden of assisting the jury should rest upon both the judge and
counsel. The means of diminishing the complexity of a case are
found in judicial practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the United States Code.
A. Pretrial Proceedings
Elimination of some of the problems in complex litigation can
take place before the empaneling of the jury. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may direct the attorneys to ap-
pear for a conference for the purpose of simplifying the issues,
eliminating unnecessary proof, limiting the number of expert wit-
nesses, making preliminary reference to a master and bringing
about any other changes necessary for disposition of the mat-
ter.194
The provisions for pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 195 can be crucial in narrowing the issues for the
jury. The provision for admissions of fact196 reduces the need for
juror inquiry. The provision for the use of a master,197 provides
the court with the ability to assist the jurors in complex matters
by permitting a master to make findings on issues submitted to
him and then allowing these findings to be presented as evidence
to the jury for their consideration. The important function of a
master in complex actions was recognized in Dairy Queen v.
Wood,198 wherein the Court stated:
In view of the powers given to the District Courts by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 (b) to appoint masters to assist the jury in those exceptional
cases where the legal issues are too complicated for the jury to adequately
handle alone, the burden of such a showing is considerably increased and
it will indeed be a rare case in which it can be met.19 9
194. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16. For a discussion of this, see In re United States Finan-
cial Securities Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, en-
acted in 1938, merged the law and equity courts. See, Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday
Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1942).
196. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a) governs requests for admissions.
197. FED. R. Crv. P. 53 controls the appointment, compensation, reference, pow-
ers, proceedings, and report of a master. Under the section pertaining to reference
it makes special note of the ways in which a master might compliment a complex
jury trial: "(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not
the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the
issues are complicated. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
198. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
199. 369 U.S. at 478.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permit the court to
order separate trials of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
third-party claim or of any separate issue, while preserving the
right to jury trial under the seventh amendment.200 This power to
bifurcate the trial preserves the right to jury trial in the role to
which it has been traditionally assigned, and allows removal of
complex issues for separate adjudication.
B. The Trial Proceedings
The federal rules govern the right to jury trial and require that
a demand for jury trial be made in a timely manner.201 In the in-
terests of assisting the jury, the federal judge may, during the
course of the trial, express to the jury his opinion on the facts,
while leaving to them the ultimate determination. 202 He may di-
rect the jury's attention to evidence he believes to be of special
significance, provided he distinguishes between matters of law
and matters of opinion.203 The jury may be informed by the court
when there is insufficient evidence to justify a verdict.204
The federal rules empower the court to entertain motions for a
directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.205
The federal judge may also grant a new trial if there is precedent
for such action.2 06 All of these court powers have at one time
been criticized as encroachments on the right to jury trial.207 Yet,
they serve to preserve the checks and balances, to guard against
irrational verdicts and to facilitiate the use of juries. The rules do
not, however, deal with the particulars of presentation of evi-
dence. For this reason, a number of studies have been made in
the interests of providing guidelines for jury use.208
During trial, the court may be able to aid juror recollections by
permitting jurors to take notes in notebooks which they can con-
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
201. FED. R. Crv. P. 38 (b).
202. United States v. Reading Railroad, 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887).
203. Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297, 302 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 131 (1851).
204. Sparf v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 99-100 (1895).
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
207. See e.g., the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), wherein he objected that the process of directing ver-
dicts "marks a continuation of the gradual process of judicial erosion which in
one-hundred-fifty years has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential
guarantee of the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 397.
208. See generally, SOLOMON, MANAGEMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM (1975); U.S.
Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration National In-
stitute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, A GUIDE TO JUROR USAGE (1974).
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tinue to refer to throughout trial and during deliberations. 209 The
court can also provide interim jury charges, reemphasizing the
law, refreshing their recollection, helping them to maintain per-
spective.210 The deliberations might be eased by permitting ju-
rors to review exhibits and transcripts and allowing them to read
the depositions out of sequence. 2 n'
Also, the court may require that the jury deliver a special ver-
dict, or a general verdict accompanied by special answers to inter-
rogatories. 212 This should safeguard against irrational verdicts by
requiring more than a mere affirmative or negative answer to a
general question. Instead, specific questions can be propounded
and the answers thereto will establish whether the jury compre-
hended the issues and acted in accordance with applicable law.
All of these rules and judicial precedents provide a means
whereby the court can prevent problems with jury trials in com-
plex litigation without abolishing the use of juries and the tradi-
tional role they have held in our system of justice. The necessity
for eliminating jury trials in complex litigation must therefore be
proven to be so great that utilization of all of the above proce-
dures will be ineffective. The Supreme Court has held that there
is no right to a nonjury trial.213 Our history, our Constitution, and
our present jurists2 14 have called for the preservation of civil jury
trials. However, it has been suggested that the compelling nature
of this right can only be overcome by a conflicting constitutional
mandate. Our last area of inquiry will focus on such a conflict.
VI. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
It is possible that the Supreme Court could end the constitu-
tional ambiguity surrounding the seventh amendment by constru-
209. See, Comment, Taking Note of Note Taking, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB.
565 (1974).
210. These possibilities and others are discussed in Ell, The Right to an Incom-
petent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10
CoNN. L. REV. 775, 785 (1978).
211. Id.
212. FED. R. Crv. P. 50. In the event that the court wishes immediate review of
such a decision, the court can certify the question for interlocutory review so that
the court of appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). Note also the sections pertaining to jury trials men-
tioned earlier: 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976) (fair cross section); 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (West
Supp. 1979) (compensation of $30.00 per day).
213. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
214. See discussion of Zenith case in text accompanying notes 143-49 supra.
ing the fifth amendment as a limitation on the seventh. The
possibility of such an occurrence has been raised by some legal/
commentators. 2 15 Thus, this troublesome question must focus on
the possibility that procedural safeguards of the fifth amendment
prevent the trial of complex cases by a jury under the concepts of
due process and fairness.
The thrust of the due process argument lies in the fifth amend-
ment requirement that where suits are litigated in a federal fo-
rum, the court must utilize appropriate procedures to ensure fair
decisions. 216 The Supreme Court has stated that a "fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." 217 Since the
thrust of the due process clause has always been the implementa-
tion of a constitutional scheme of fundamental fairness, 2 18 sub-
mission of a case to a body incapable of deciding the issues would
violate the provisions of the fifth amendment.
The trial by jury has generally been associated with the tradi-
tional notion of fundamental fairness. 219 The Court in seeking to
provide an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community has held that this right does not guarantee a repre-
sentative jury, but a representative panel from which the jury is
drawn.220 The focus of the law has therefore centered on the ar-
ray from which the jurors are drawn, rather than the composition
of any particular jury.221
Further, any allegations that the fifth amendment requires that
determinations of factual and legal issues must be made by a
body capable of fairly and equitably resolving them, and that a
jury cannot serve this purpose, must be answered by the lan-
guage of the Court:
[W] e have never held that it is beyond the power of the State to provide
for the trial by jury of questions of fact because they are complicated.
Cases at law triable by a jury in the federal courts often involve most diffi-
cult and complex questions, as, for example, in patent cases at law
presenting issues of validity and infringement. Most difficult questions of
fact in protracted trials, with much conflicting expert testimony are not in-
frequently presented in criminal cases triable by jury. The issue of life or
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death may be decided in such a case.
2 2 2
The history of jury trials, and the potential use of available aids,
stand for the proposition that the jury is as capable as the trial
judge to act as the trier of fact in all cases, complex or not. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the due process guarantees of the fifth
amendment will continue to be a limitation upon the right of a
jury trial under the seventh amendment.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether or not the right of trial by jury should
be restricted or even eliminated in protracted and complex civil
cases in the interest of fairness and justice must be answered in
the negative. The right to jury trial is part of the fundamental
freedoms painfully won by the colonists and preserved for us
under the seventh amendment. The concept of judgment by one's
peers is a bulwark of our democracy, lauded again and again by
the philosophers, authors and leaders of our country. More im-
portantly, it calls for the representation by the community prior
to deprivation of property, and representation to the community
of the fairness of our laws and judicial system.
Each individual is responsible for knowing and abiding by the
laws. It must continue to be the duty of the judiciary to answer to
the people in the enforcement of the law. Concerns of delay or
expense cannot justify retreat to a judicial bureaucracy. Allega-
tions of irrationality and incompetence will exist in greater force
when the courts need not explain their verdicts on the grounds of
complexity and the incapacity of laymen to comprehend. The so-
lution lies not in abandonment of justice as we have always
known it. Surely fairness includes the right to community knowl-
edge and concern. The right to jury trial is premised upon such
community participation and therefore, should be preserved.
GEORGIANA G. RODIGER
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